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Please replace CSU’s Summary of Options with this document.
CSU says its information is “internal and external,” but it’s
unattributed, “cherry picked,” and biased. Information below is
verifiable via internet. It uses CSU median numbers for costs
and for donations, unless blatantly erroneous. It considers
important circumstances impacting the General Fund. One, is a
football program that at best breaks even. Two, is a football
program that consistently produces top 25 teams and
corresponding profits, calculated as $240,000,000 over 30
Minimum Hughes: $31,500,000
Initial Cost is $39,000,000 (CSU median figure). If donations are
$7,500,000 (CSU median figure), Net Cost is $31,500,000
from the GF (General Fund). With “top ranks and
corresponding profits” (possible even next year), the
General Fund gains all revenues above the cost of the
Hughes 2050: Cost equals $3,800,000/year/30 years.
Initial Cost is $97,000,000, including: Hughes Minimum at
$39,000,000 and adding 4,000 seats at $17,000,000 (source,
CSU). Then, to build the equivalent of Boise State’s 2008
Stueckle Sky Center, a stadium upgrade virtually identical to
“Hughes 2050,” costs $41,000,000 today (source, Insee)…
$37,500,000 in 2008. Stueckle has all the “premium” aspects
CSU plans, 80,000 more square feet than CSU plans, two
elevator towers, and the world’s largest movable window. If
donations are $30,000,000, Net Cost is a $67,000,000
revenue bond. With “program at best breaks even,” the GF
pays $115,000,000; with “top ranks and profits,” the GF
Campus, Phase One: Cost equals $11,100,000/year/30
Initial Cost is $236,000,000, including: Hughes Maintenance at
$9,000,000 (cost of maintenance until Fall, 2018), the CSU
construction estimate of $189,000,000, and a minimum 20%
cost overrun (that every concrete stadium has had) of
$38,000,000. If donations are $42,500,000, Net Cost is a
$193,500,000 revenue bond. With “program at best breaks
even,” the GF pays $332,600,000; with “top 25 ranks and
profits,” the GF pays $192,600,000.
Campus P3: Cost equals the equivalent of
Initial Cost is $295,000,000, including: Hughes Maintenance of
$9,000,000, CSU’s construction estimate of $225,000,000, a
20% cost overrun of $45,000,000, and a Debt Reserve Fund
(financed either privately or by CSU) of $16,000,000. Net Costs
first include $28,000,000 for Hughes Maintenance and Debt
Reserve (if financed). Second, the “lease” payments—after
applying $47,500,000 in donations—are $477,000,000
($15,900,000/year/30 years). With “program at best breaks
even,” the GF pays $505,000,000; with “top 25 ranks and
profits,” the GF pays $265,000,000.
What about promoter CLS’s revenue projections? Forget them.
Their unrealistic analysis pretends the football program’s free.
But program profit and not projected revenue determines the
stadium’s cost to the General Fund. Boise State (in a stadium
now having everything CSU wants) gives an apt example of
“program profit corresponding to top 25 ranks,” $6,800,000
revenue above program costs for 2012 (source, Sportsmoney).
If the Rams have tremendous success most seasons, earnings like Boise’s would provide about $240,000,000 profit, over 30 years, towards a stadium. (That’s factored in above.)
Remember, that in attendance, location, admissions, game‐day
experience, donations, etc., sports economists see no benefit in
this project realistic enough to justify spending general funds.
And Options 3 and 4 seriously harm the General Fund.
Remember also, though the local economy benefits
temporarily from any CSU building project (Options 2‐4), the
opposite’s true for students. They will have to pay for it. So
honesty about costs matters.